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STANDARD OF PROOF, PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, AND 
PLEA BARGAINING: HOW WRONGFUL CONVICTION DATA 
EXPOSES INADEQUATE PRE-TRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
DR. ROBERT SCHEHR* 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article addresses two fundamental principles directly affecting 
plea convictions – the standard of proof required for indictment, and 
the presumption of innocence. In grand jury states, prosecutors procure 
indictments with ease. This, accompanied by the lack of a robust pre-
trial presumption of innocence, increases the likelihood of wrongful 
conviction. Therefore, it is my opinion that in order to maintain justice 
for an accused, contemporary criminal procedure must return to the 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard to indict. It is for precisely 
these reasons that this standard was originally adopted by our nation’s 
founding judges. Concerns about prosecutorial overreach that were 
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common at the founding of our American judicial system were primarily 
driven by prior experiences with England. Today, we see the 
manifestation of these concerns as legal and social science scholars 
have generated comprehensive assessments of the correlates 
generating wrongful convictions of actually innocent men and women. 
Plea bargaining has become an important instrument of state 
authority necessary to efficiently process felony criminal cases. 
However, given its hegemonic ubiquity throughout the system, it is 
apparent to me that the failure of both Supreme Court case law, and 
Congressionally generated federal rules legitimating pleas has given 
rise to a shadow administration of justice. Therefore, it is not difficult 
to conclude that the sleight of hand remains the presumption of guilt 
from arrest through indictment. This is in spite of our nation’s tendency 
to valorize a system of due process that affords protection of rights 
accruing to defendants who elect to plead not guilty and go to trial, and 
the opaque exercise of prosecutorial authority that constitutes 95 to 97 
percent of all felony convictions procured through plea bargaining. 
Viewed in this context, Federal Rule 11 – with its “rational” colloquy 
ostensibly designed to assure the court and serve as a palliative to the 
public that a defendant is entering the plea knowingly and voluntarily, 
in addition to the requirement that pleas must possess a “factual basis” 
(never yet clearly defined by either a court or the United States 
Congress) – is a tissue-thin cloak to legitimate what is otherwise a 
severe usurpation of the protection of liberty interests that are 
paramount to a democracy. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a strongly worded 177-page opinion, Federal District Court 
Judge, William G. Young, said, “The focus of our entire criminal justice 
system has shifted away from trials and juries and adjudication to a 
massive system of sentence bargaining that is heavily rigged against the 
accused citizen.”1 Because we now have a criminal justice system that 
is largely constituted by plea bargaining, in essence “Americans are 
bargaining away their innocence.”2 How did this happen? 
At least four important events merged in the 1970s to bowtie plea 
bargaining, thereby virtually insulating it from constitutional 
challenges. These four events were: (1) the last of the decade’s Supreme 
Court jurisprudence addressing the constitutionality of plea 
bargaining;3 (2) incorporation of the probable cause standard of proof 
for indictment at both the state and federal levels;4 (3) the Supreme 
Court’s limiting the presumption of innocence to trial;5 and (4) the 1975 
Amendment to Rule 32(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Rule 32 (a)(2) (now Rule 32 (c)(5)) was amended in 1975 
to say, “Proposed subdivision (a)(2) provides that the court is not 
dutybound to advise the defendant of a right to appeal when the 
sentence is imposed following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.”6 
________________________________ 
1. Adam Liptak, Federal Law on Sentencing is Unjust, Judge Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 23, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/23/us/federal-law-on-
sentencing-is-unjust-judge-rules.html. 
2.  Tim Lynch, Americans are Bargaining Away their Innocence, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory.wp.2016/01/20/ 
americans -are-bargaining-away-their-innocence/. 
3.  See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362–65 (1978).  
4.  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MODEL GRAND JURY 
CHARGE ¶ 25 (Mar. 2005), http://cldc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/model-gj-
charge.pdf. 
5.  See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).  
6.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2) (emphasis added). Rule 32 was amended in 1994, 
and the section pertaining to the responsibility of judges to advise defendants of their 
right to appeal following a guilty plea is now Rule 32(c)(5). The language in the notes 
to the 1994 amendment is unchanged: “Subdivision (c)(5), concerning notification of 
the right to appeal, was formerly included in subdivision (a)(2). Although the 
provision has been rewritten, the Committee intends no substantive change in practice. 
That is, the court may, but is not required to, advise a defendant who has entered a 
guilty plea, nolo contendere plea or a conditional guilty plea of any right to appeal 
(such as an appeal challenging jurisdiction). However, the duty to advise the 
3
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A strong argument can be made that the Supreme Court and various 
legislative bodies addressed these four matters in a coordinated way to 
significantly limit the potential for constitutional challenges to pleas.7 
With the exception of the Court’s plea jurisprudence (which I have 
already addressed in a previous article confronting the constitutionality 
of pleas)8 and the language specifying a judge’s responsibility under 
Rule 32, I will examine both the evolution and prudence of the probable 
cause standard to indict, and the limitation of the presumption of 
innocence to trial. Each represents a matter of pressing concern. 
The purpose of this article is to advance questions seemingly so 
obvious that they largely go without comment in published legal 
scholarship. For example, one could ask: What is the standard of proof 
required for conviction via plea bargain? When compared to the 
constitutionally mandated requirement that prosecutors must meet the 
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to convict at trial, does the 
criminal procedure leading up to plea negotiations represent an 
unconstitutional deviation both in principle and in practice? Should 
there exist a pre-trial presumption of innocence?9 In the absence of a 
pre-trial presumption of innocence and with the low standard of proof 
required for indictment, is it likely that a significant number of accused 
but innocent suspects may be wrongfully convicted? For reasons 
articulated below, I do not believe that the criminal procedure leading 
up to plea negotiations satisfies the Supreme Court’s high standard for 
felony conviction, because these procedures lack a presumption of 
innocence. It is this presumption of guilt that generates fertile ground 
________________________________ 
defendant in such cases extends only to advice on the right to appeal any sentence 
imposed” (emphasis added). 
7.  During the 1970s, legislative initiatives generated new categories of crime, 
and most important, enhanced sentencing. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE 
NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012); 
MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT (2015); NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: 
HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA (2014); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE 
OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011).  
8.  See generally Robert Schehr, The Emperor’s New Clothes: Intellectual 
Dishonesty and the Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 385 
(2015). 
9.  G.P. Garrett, False Presumptions Counter to the Presumptions of Innocence, 
J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 851, 853 (1917) (“Presumptions, in and of 
themselves, contain no virtue and no vice. Justly drawn, they are advantageous, useful 
and inevitable. Wrongly drawn, they are mere insubstantial illusions.”). 
4
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for law enforcement and prosecutors to procure convictions via grand 
jury indictments where only probable cause is the standard of proof to 
indict. 
To convincingly develop my argument, I am going to request that 
my readers suspend their disbelief. Since the 1970s, plea bargaining has 
become so ubiquitous that much about its procedure has attained an 
essentialist quality that takes for granted the requisite standard of proof 
in criminal cases. At issue in this article is whether it is conceptually 
and procedurally efficacious to frame plea bargaining within the 
context of standards of evidence sufficiency, also referred to as 
“standards of proof.” When taken together, institutional rationales and 
the implementation of plea bargaining have been established as legal 
norms reaching hegemonic status. That is, nearly all criminal justice 
practitioners, as well as victims and offenders, view the 
institutionalization of plea bargaining as an immutable matter of fact.10 
Whether it serves systematic efficiency interests by saving resources, 
or by dispensing justice with greater speed and efficiency, plea 
bargaining exists for all actors as the normative mechanism through 
which felony cases are prosecuted. I quite intentionally invoke Antonio 
Gramsci’s11 conceptualization of hegemony to introduce a theoretical 
level of complexity. In doing so, I hope this will move our discussion 
away from one that is exclusively doctrinal and internal to 
administrators of justice in order to locate plea practice in a system-
reproducing context. Specifically, Gramsci defines social hegemony as 
possessing two aspects: 
1. The “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the 
population to the general direction imposed on social life by the 
dominant fundamental group; this consent is “historically” caused by 
the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group 
enjoys because of its position and function in the world of 
production. 
________________________________ 
10.  Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (“The disposition of 
criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes 
loosely called ‘plea bargaining,’ is an essential component of the administration of 
justice.”).  
11. Antonio Gramsci was an Italian Communist Party leader who died in prison 
after being arrested for speaking out against fascism during the early twentieth 
century. Antonio Gramsci Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, http://www.biography.com/ 
people/antonio-gramsci-9317929. 
5
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2. The apparatus of state coercive power which “legally” enforces 
discipline on those groups who do not “consent” either actively or 
passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of 
society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and 
direction when spontaneous consent has failed.12 
Colloquially, we may define hegemony as rule by consent, backed 
up by the threat of coercion. Actions taken by the Supreme Court, 
Congress, and the Judicial Conference in the 1970s, as they pertained 
to setting the foundation for plea bargaining, have generated consent 
from bureaucratic actors administering justice (e.g., law enforcement, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges), defendants, and from the public 
more generally. Invoking the concept of hegemony tips my hand as one 
who views the proliferation of plea bargaining as being on par with 
enhanced social control.13 After all, plea bargaining takes place in 
private, requires renunciation of fundamental rights protections,14 and 
proceeds following indictment based upon the second lowest standard 
of proof.15 Included is the fact that when presenting evidence before a 
grand jury, prosecutors need not concern themselves with Federal Rules 
of Evidence nor the presentation of exculpatory evidence and can 
reconvene a grand jury as frequently as necessary until finally procuring 
an indictment.16 What emerges is a portrait of state power that bears a 
________________________________ 
12.  ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 12 (1971). 
13.  My emphasis upon plea bargaining as social control is clearly antithetical 
to both the resource efficiency and mutual benefit claims established by the United 
States Supreme Court. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978); Bordenkircher 
v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); Chaffin v. Synchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973); 
Santabello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 
(1970); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 
U.S. 790 (1970). 
14.  Plea bargaining requires the waiver of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, 
with the exception of the right to counsel. Plea Bargain, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/plea_bargain (last visited Nov. 14, 2017).  
15.  See infra Figure 1. 
16.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6.; see also Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do 
Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 261 (1995); Kevin 
K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2346 (2008). 
For relevant case law, see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1743–44 
(1992) (federal appellate courts may not exercise supervisory power to dismiss an 
otherwise valid indictment because of the prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence to the grand jury); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349–50 (1974) 
6
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striking resemblance to the fifteenth-century Star Chamber;17 hardly the 
epitome of due process in a democracy. Viewing pleas through the lens 
of hegemony, a taken-for-granted normative acceptance of an 
undernourished system of due process emerges where public consent 
has been manufactured through a series of significant legal and political 
maneuvers. Furthermore, we cannot forget the potential threat of 
coercion should a defendant reject the plea and elect to pursue trial. This 
threat is leveraged by the fact that that the defendant will confront a 
“trial tax”18 if convicted and as a consequence, suffer a far graver 
punishment.19 With this in mind, plea bargaining then manifests as a 
________________________________ 
(refusing to extend the exclusionary rule to grand juries); Costello v. United States, 
350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) (indictment not subject to challenge on grounds it was based 
on hearsay).  
17.  While there are qualitative differences, the similarities between 
contemporary plea negotiations and the Star Chamber are too recognizable to resist. 
The Star Chamber was established in 1487 by King Henry VII. The name, Star 
Chamber, is based upon the star-painted ceiling of the room at Westminster Palace 
where the court sat. Beginning with the reigns of James I (1603–25) and Charles I 
(1625–49), the Star Chamber became increasingly oppressive. Star Chamber, THE 
FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Star+Chamber (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2017). According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the Star Chamber was 
“[a]n English Court having broad civil and criminal jurisdiction at the king’s 
discretion and noted for its secretive, arbitrary, and oppressive procedures, including 
compulsory self-incrimination, inquisitorial investigation, and the absence of juries.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999) [hereinafter BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY]. 
18.  “Trial tax” is the colloquial reference to the difference between a sentence 
offered to a defendant in a plea deal and what the defendant may expect to receive if 
convicted at trial. As a matter of right, all felony defendants may exercise their Sixth 
Amendment right to trial. However, to discourage exercise of that right via guilty 
pleas, courts give defendants far more severe sentences if they go to trial and are found 
guilty. For more information on the trial tax, see Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial 
Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1082–83 (1976). 
A 2015 analysis found that federal defendants who exercised their right to trial and 
were found guilty experienced a sixty-four percent sentencing enhancement. Andrew 
Chongseh Kim, Underestimating the Trial Penalty: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Federal Trial Penalty and Critique of the Abrams Study, 84 MISS. L.J. 1195, 1200 
(2015).   
19.  To be clear, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that neither plea 
bargaining alone, nor the threat of significantly harsher sentences upon conviction at 
trial, amounts to coercion. In one case, the Supreme Court held, “To punish a person 
because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation 
of the most basic sort . . . . But in the ‘give-and-take’ of plea bargaining there is no 
7
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“legal-rational”20 mode of hegemonic state power.21 Recognition of this 
fact appears in European human rights law where plea bargaining in 
exchange for downward departures in sentencing “may violate the 
presumption of innocence” because the incentive of a reduced sentence 
may be at odds with the presumption.22 As my argument develops in 
the following pages, it will be helpful to keep this emphasis on 
hegemony in mind. 
Since the 1970s, the scales have tipped heavily in the direction of 
pleas following indictment as opposed to establishing proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt at trial before triers of fact. Given the pervasiveness 
of plea bargaining, we must step back and deconstruct existing criminal 
procedure leading to indictment prior to commencement of plea 
negotiations. This will allow us to discern whether the standard of 
proof, upon which rests determination of the quantum of proof 
necessary to indict, is a signifier that is comprehensive enough to 
generate a conviction in a criminal case. 
II. STANDARD OF PROOF 
A standard of proof is “the level of persuasion required in court to 
be able to reach a judicial verdict.”23 There are eight standards of 
evidence proficiency, also referred to as standards of proof.24 Standards 
range from the minimum amount of evidence required—none or 
________________________________ 
such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or 
reject the prosecution’s offer.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). I 
will not pursue the Court’s emphasis on the contractual nature of plea bargaining, as 
I have already done so elsewhere. See Schehr, supra note 8, at 391. 
20.  Legal-Rational authority was theorized by German sociologist Max Weber 
to mean three principal things: (1) law is rational to the extent that decisions are based 
upon existing unambiguous rules; (2) law is formal to the degree that the standards 
used for arriving at a decision are internal to the legal system (autopoiesis); and (3) 
law is logical to the degree that rules are the product of conscious construction through 
syllogistic reasoning. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 217 (1978).  
21.  See id. 
22.  See Andrew Ashworth, Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence, 123 
S. AFRICAN L.J. 63, 80 (2006).  
23.  Thomas Christopher Rider, What is the Most Useful Standard of Proof in 
Criminal Law?, PRAGMATISM TOMORROW, 2013, at 1, 1. 
24.  See MARVIN ZALMAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTION AND 
SOCIETY 139 (Pearson Prentice Hall, 5th ed. 2008).  
8
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“mere” suspicion (also referred to in Common Law as “scintilla of 
evidence”)—to that requiring virtually no doubt about the facts alleged 
and the defendant’s culpability i.e., proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Table 1: Standards of Evidence Sufficiency25 
 
STANDARDS OF EVIDENCE 
SUFFICIENCY—ALL 
STANDARDS OF EVIDENCE 
SUFFICIENCY—CRIMINAL 
   
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt Proof beyond a reasonable doubt    
Clear and convincing evidence     
Preponderance of the evidence     
Prima facie case     
Substantial evidence on the whole 
record 
    
Probable cause Probable cause    
Reasonable suspicion Reasonable suspicion    
None or “mere” suspicion     
 
 
We can visually represent the standard of proof using the pyramid chart 
(Figure 1) below,26 where the quantum of evidence increases as we 
move from bottom to top. 
In criminal cases, we typically apply only the reasonable suspicion, 
probable cause, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt standards. Figure 
1 below attempts to visually demonstrate, from bottom to top, the 
increasingly rigorous standards of evidence-sufficiency applied in 
criminal cases.27 Starting from the bottom, the lowest standard of proof 
depicted in the pyramid is reasonable suspicion, which pertains to a 
“particularized and objective basis, supported by articulable facts, for 
suspecting a person of criminal activity.”28 It is the first level of proof 
required by police officers to justify Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure, as clarified in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Terry v. Ohio.29 
Requiring more than a hunch, reasonable suspicion demands a “totality 
of the circumstances” assessment that considers the experience and 
________________________________ 
25.  Id. 
26.  See infra Figure 1. 
27.  See id. 
28.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 1273.  
29.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1868, 1885 (1968).  
9
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expertise of police officers, the reliability of informants, and the 
probability that a crime may be in progress or previously occurred.30 
Figure 1: Standards of Proof
 
Moving up the pyramid, with a modicum of enhanced sufficiency 
of evidence over reasonable suspicion is probable cause. Probable cause 
is defined as: 
A reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is 
committing a crime or that a place contains specific items connected 
with a crime. Under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause – which 
amounts to more than a bare suspicion but less than evidence that 
would justify a conviction – must be shown before an arrest warrant 
or search warrant may be issued.31 
Probable cause is the standard of proof necessary to make an arrest, 
and to indict a defendant before a grand jury.32 
Unlike the two standards of proof previously discussed, 
preponderance of the evidence is not a standard of proof applied in 
criminal cases. Rather, it is used in civil trials and requires meeting a 
standard of proof that is “the greater weight of the evidence.”33 It is 
________________________________ 
30.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17. 
31.  Id. at 977.  
32.  See State v. Atwood, 301 P.3d 1255, 1260 (2013). 
33.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 1201. 
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evidence that while insufficient to establish proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, “is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side 
of the issue” over the other.34 
The most stringent of the standards of proof is proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Model Penal Code section 1.12(1) establishes that in 
criminal proceedings, “[n]o person may be convicted of an offense 
unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is 
assumed.”35 And while the definition and interpretation of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt avoids precision, we may agree that it is, 
“[t]he standard that must be met by the prosecution’s evidence in a 
criminal prosecution: that no other logical explanation can be derived 
from the facts except that the defendant committed the crime, thereby 
overcoming the presumption that a person is innocent until proven 
guilty.”36 Why is this important? 
In their dissenting opinion in the 1952 case of Leland v. Oregon,37 
Justices Frankfurter and Black emphasize the probity of the proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard: 
[F]rom the time that the law which we have inherited has emerged 
from dark and barbaric times, the conception of justice which has 
dominated our criminal law has refused to put an accused at the 
hazard of punishment if he fails to remove every reasonable doubt of 
his innocence in the minds of jurors. It is the duty of the Government 
to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This notion – basic 
in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society – is a 
requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, 
procedural content of ‘due process.’38 
In In re Winship,39 the United States Supreme Court upheld proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt as the standard necessary for procuring a 
criminal conviction. 
________________________________ 
34.  Id.  
35.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2016). 
36.  Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Beyond+a+Reasonable+Doubt (last visited Mar. 5, 
2017).  
37.  Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802–03 (1952).  
38.  Id.  
39.  397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). 
11
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The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years 
as a Nation. The “demand for a higher degree of persuasion in 
criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient times, 
(though) its crystallization into the formula ‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt’ seems to have occurred as late as 1798. It is now accepted in 
common law jurisdictions as the measure of persuasion by which the 
prosecution must convince the trier of all the essential elements of 
guilt.”40 
The Court continues by reiterating the significance of the “proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt” standard to “[reduce] the risk of 
convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete 
substance for the presumption of innocence – that bedrock ‘axiomatic 
and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of 
the administration of our criminal law.’”41 Still, for my purposes the 
most impactful statement from the Court comes from the dissenters in 
an earlier New York Court of Appeals case: 
[A] person accused of a crime . . . would be at a severe disadvantage, 
a disadvantage amounting to a lack of fundamental fairness, if he 
could be adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of 
the same evidence as would suffice in a civil case [preponderance of 
the evidence] (emphasis added).42 
Returning for a moment to both Table 1 and Figure 1, conviction 
based upon a standard of proof required in a civil case—preponderance 
of the evidence—is a far lower hurdle to overcome than the proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard applied to criminal convictions.43 
That means that the amount of certainty required to establish guilt is far 
less stringent in civil than in criminal cases. This is because damages 
resulting from civil convictions are primarily monetary and do not 
include the loss of liberty or the degree of public shaming, damage to 
reputation, loss of family and friends, loss of work, and the like, which 
generally transpire from a criminal conviction. Furthermore, the 
Winship majority proclaimed that, “[i]t is critical that the moral force of 
________________________________ 
40.  Id.  
41.  Id. at 363.  
42.  Id. (quoting W. v. Family Court, 24 N.Y.2d 196, 205 (1969)).  
43.  See supra Table 1 & Figure 1. 
12
California Western Law Review, Vol. 54 [2018], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol54/iss1/3
8 (Do Not Delete) 7/11/2018  11:35 AM 
2017]    STANDARD OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE  63 
the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people 
in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.”44 Before turning 
its attention to application of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard to juvenile defendants, the Court affirmed the constitutionality 
of the standard: “we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects 
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 
charged.”45 The conclusion cannot be  more clear: in criminal cases 
where the loss of personal liberty and resources are at stake, the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires the state to bear 
the burden of proving each element of its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
The Supreme Court’s articulation of the proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard for criminal convictions is laudable for its emphasis on 
the presumption of innocence and the magnitude of evidence required 
before the accused may suffer loss of liberty. However, it is now widely 
known that at both the state and federal levels only about five percent 
of criminal cases will proceed to trial, with 95 to 97 percent of cases 
being resolved via plea bargains.46 Despite the fact that defendants who 
plead guilty may suffer the same negative effects as those who are 
convicted at trial, the state is not required to prove its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt in the plea bargain context. Rather, plea bargains 
commence upon indictment, often followed by presentment before a 
grand jury.47 
________________________________ 
44.  In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. 
45.  Id.  
46.  “Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of 
state convictions result from guilty pleas.” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) 
(citing Missouri v. Frye, 132 U.S. 134, 143 (2012)).  
47.  According to Wayne LaFave et al., there are 18 states that require an 
indictment for most felonies: Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. WAYNE 
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 775 (5th ed. 2009). In addition to the states 
identified by LaFave et al., the National Center for State Courts includes: District of 
Columbia, Guam, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, and 
Wyoming. Grand Jury Statutes and Rules, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., 
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Jury/Grand-Juries/State-Links.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 
2018). The state of Arizona permits the use of a grand jury for purposes of indictment. 
Reporter’s Guide to Arizona’s Legal Community, ST. BAR OF ARIZ., 
13
Schehr: STANDARD OF PROOF, PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, AND PLEA BARGAINING:
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2018
Schehr camera ready (Do Not Delete) 7/11/2018  11:35 AM 
64 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
The standard of proof required for indictment, whether it is the 
product of a preliminary hearing or grand jury hearing,48 is probable 
cause. Returning to the definition of probable cause used above, “more 
than a bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a 
conviction” is required.49 Also, recall the Supreme Court in Winship 
established that the constitutionally mandated burden of proof required 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, along with its accompanying presumption 
of innocence—applies to all criminal convictions.50 It is appropriate to 
be reminded of the extremely precise language used by the Court to 
emphasize this point: “[i]t is critical that the moral force of the criminal 
law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt 
whether innocent men are being condemned.”51 And as indicated 
above, the Court makes clear that any standard of proof falling below 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt must certainly be unconstitutional. 
Returning for a moment to our standard of proof pyramid, it is clear that 
even the preponderance of the evidence standard typically applied in 
civil trials, which requires significantly greater evidentiary weight than 
probable cause, fails the Court’s constitutional test.52 The Court in 
Winship raised the evidentiary bar in its concise statement of what is 
required for criminal conviction. 
To summarize, there are two standards of proof required for 
criminal conviction – proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and probable 
cause. The proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard only applies to 
________________________________ 
http://www.azbar.org/newsevents/mediacontact/reporterguide/ (last visited Nov. 17, 
2017). 
48.  “Prosecutors in twenty-eight states may bring a felony charge based on a 
sworn statement (information) and then may bring a charge either before a preliminary 
hearing or before a grand jury.” MATTHEW LIPPMAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 530 
(2011). 
49.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 1219. 
50.  In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 361. 
51.  Id. at 364. 
52.  “The preponderance of the evidence standard is satisfied if the maximum 
weight of the applicable pro argument outweighs the maximum weight of the 
applicable con arguments, by even a small amount of evidential weight.” Thomas F. 
Gordon & Douglass Walton, A Formal Model of Legal Proof Standards and Burdens, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH INT’L CONF. OF THE INT’L. SOC’Y FOR THE STUDY OF 
ARGUMENTATION, http://dougwalton.ca/papers%20in%pdf/11ISSAStndard.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
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trials whereas felony criminal conviction as a result of plea bargaining 
is satisfied by a probable cause determination, usually from a 
preliminary hearing or grand jury proceeding. It is my contention that, 
when juxtaposed with the Supreme Court’s compelling case for proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt as the constitutionally mandated standard 
for conviction at a criminal trial, the standard of proof required to 
convict between 95 and 97 percent of criminal defendants via plea 
bargaining is unconstitutional. The remainder of this article challenges 
the constitutional legitimacy of convictions based upon the probable 
cause standard as opposed to the more rigorous beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard. 
III. PLEA BARGAINS, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, AND THE PROBABLE 
CAUSE STANDARD 
At the time of this writing there are 1886 exonerees listed in the 
National Registry of Exoneration database, spanning from 1989 to 
2016.53 Of particular interest to this article is the number of wrongful 
convictions generated as a result of the guilty plea. From 1989 to 2016 
there have been a total of 276 identified cases of wrongful conviction 
where the accused accepted a guilty plea but was later determined to be 
innocent.54 That amounts to a little more than fifteen-percent of the total 
number of identified wrongful convictions. 
Among those states that make use of grand jury indictments as their 
principal charging instrument, there are 180 exonerees who originally 
entered guilty pleas.55 Table 2,56 provided below, culls data from the 
National Registry to illustrate the following three data points: (1) states 
that make use of grand jury indictments as their principal charging 
instrument, (2) the number of exonerees who entered into guilty pleas, 
and (3) the total number of exonerations from each of the grand jury 
states. Since 1989, twenty-six grand jury states collectively convicted 
180 innocent people via the plea, about twenty percent of the total 895 
wrongful convictions.57 
________________________________ 
53.  NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/ 
exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2016).  
54.  Id.  
55.  Id.  
56.  See infra Table 2. 
57.  NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 53. 
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I present this particular plea exoneration data to emphasize one 
significant point: in 180 cases (twenty percent of the total), innocent 
people were presented with an indictment following presentment before 
a grand jury where the standard of proof was probable cause. All of 
these 180 people accepted the terms of a guilty plea.58 I have argued 
elsewhere that guilty pleas give rise to a significant number of wrongful 
convictions.59 Legal and social science scholars simply do not have 
access to the kind of data necessary to determine which among the 
felony plea convictions, comprising of 95 to 97 percent of all felony 
convictions, are cases where the defendant is innocent. The National 
Registry data presents us only with cases that have been identified as 
wrongful convictions, but surely there are more. 
A host of legal fictions have been constructed to rationalize the 
constitutionality of conviction by way of plea bargain. Surely, some 
reading this article will object to my juxtaposition of trial with plea 
convictions as being a comparison of apples to oranges. In fact, those 
critics would be correct. In the United States, we have established two 
distinct mechanisms for criminal conviction: a trial that affords the 
accused their constitutionally mandated due process protections, and 
plea bargaining which occurs in the privacy of the prosecutor’s office.60 
It is important to note the temporal aspect of the plea process. Legal 
________________________________ 
58.  There were an additional 758 wrongfully convicted people whose cases 
passed through the grand jury probable cause indictment phase, but who proceeded to 
trial and were erroneously convicted. Because my primary focus in this article is on 
the standard of proof, presumption of innocence, and evidentiary standards leading to 
an indictment by grand jury and ultimately, to the plea, I will forego assessment of 
the remaining cases that proceeded to trial. However, it should be noted that these 758 
cases passed through the same grand jury indictment procedure, thereby placing the 
innocent accused in the position of having to choose between plea and trial. For many 
reasons that have been well documented, the decision to proceed to trial is equally 
fraught. See Robert Schehr & Chelsea French, Mental Competency Law and Plea 
Bargaining: A Neurophenomenoligical Critique, 79 ALBANY L.R. 1091 (2016) 
[hereinafter Mental Competency Law]. 
59.  See Schehr, supra note 8. 
60.  These protections include the highest standard of proof and protection 
provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence, which only applies to five percent of 
criminal cases, and a plea bargain which occurs in the privacy of the prosecutor’s 
office, and where the accused may be indicted by a grand jury that has been presented 
with “evidence” that would otherwise violate the Federal Rules of Evidence were it 
to be presented at trial. See Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand 
Jury Independence, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
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scholars will often contend that pleas are constitutional, and that the 
accused relinquishes her right to the presumption of innocence upon 
admission or confession to the charges.61 However, my concern, and 
the substance of this article, is temporally sensitive. What I am 
addressing is the legal process that unfolds for an accused between the 
time of the defendant’s arrest and her grand jury indictment. Once the 
indictment is procured, the prosecutor may advance toward negotiation 
of a plea. This article contends that the unconstitutionality of the plea 
process commences prior to the admission or confession where guilt is 
affirmed at the plea colloquy. It seems clear that it is the confluence of 
police investigation activities, pre-sentencing reports, case law, 
courtroom working groups, and neurophenomenological 
characteristics62 of the accused (occurring upon arrest and ending with 
________________________________ 
61.  While not the primary purpose of this article, it is important to raise an 
objection here to the certainty with which legal scholars draw this conclusion. In a 
string of Supreme Court cases including Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), Lego 
v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), and Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986), the 
United States Supreme Court has raised concerns over the probity of relying upon 
confession evidence as indicative of guilt. Specifically, in Crane Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor writing for the majority said, “Confessions, even those that have been 
found to be voluntary, are not conclusive of guilt. And, as with any other part of the 
prosecutor’s case, a confession may be shown to be ‘insufficiently corroborated or 
otherwise . . . unworthy of belief.’” Crane, 476 U.S. at 689 (quoting Twomey, 404 
U.S. at 486). Additionally, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require a “factual 
basis” to indict and engage in plea negotiations. FED. R. CRIM. PROC. R. 11. The 
construct, factual basis, has never been objectively defined to explain precisely what 
kind of evidence is necessary to meet this requirement. In most cases, there likely will 
be enough evidence in the file to garner an indictment before a grand jury, whose 
standard of proof to indict is probable cause. But that is a far cry from corroborating 
evidence necessary to validate a so-called “knowing and voluntary” confession. Of 
course, and this is the point I am addressing in this article, procedural rules directed 
at preservation of safe convictions at trial are not typically applied to the plea process. 
Rather than apply its sound reasoning in Crane to the plea process, the Court would 
likely return to its prior positions as taken in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 
(1970) and its progeny to rely upon the contractual nature of the plea. See also Robert 
E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J., 1909 
(1992); Schehr, supra note 8.  
62.  Neurophenomenology is a theoretical construct that seeks a holistic 
approach to understanding consciousness, especially with regard to decision-making. 
The theory, first advanced by Francisco Varela in the late 1990s, combines the 
substantive areas of neurology, neuropsychology, and phenomenology. 
Neurophenomenology posits a far more nuanced assessment of human consciousness 
17
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grand jury indictment), that directly implicate police officers, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys in an unconstitutional but 
immanently efficient practice of moving cases toward rapid conviction. 
Figure 2: Arrest to Pleading Continuum 
 
It is my contention that the confluence of the following factors all 
but assure innocent men and women will be wrongfully convicted via 
the plea: 
(1) The low standard of proof necessary to indict (probable 
cause); 
(2) The absence of a pre-trial presumption of innocence; 
(3) The fact that prosecutors are not bound by the Federal Rules 
of Evidence—there is no evidentiary requirement that the 
state presents exculpatory evidence; 
(4) The absence of adversarial due process; 
(5) The fact that a prosecutor may convene as many grand 
juries as is necessary to procure an indictment; 
(6) The fact that neurophenomenological factors heavily 
influence the plea bargaining process;63 and 
(7) The prevalence of Draconian state and federal sentencing 
statutes that are used by prosecutors and defense attorneys 
to encourage resolution of cases via the plea. 
________________________________ 
and decision-making and can be applied to plea bargaining. See Mental Competency 
Law, supra note 58, at 1091. 












or Not Guilty  
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Equally important to the legitimacy of a democracy, as the Supreme 
Court recognized in Winship, is the “moral force of the criminal law” 
that must not be “diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in 
doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.”64 In Table 2, data 
is culled from the National Registry of Exonerations pertaining to 
exonerations occurring since 1989 in grand jury states. 
  
________________________________ 
64.  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
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Table 2: Exonerations by states that use grand jury indictments as 
charging instrument. 
 





65 These states represent those that have been identified as requiring presentment 
before a grand jury prior to indictment. Supra note 47. 
66 At the time this article was written, there were 1886 exonerations listed as part of 
the National Registry. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 53. The 938 
exonerations reported by state in Table 2 represent roughly 53 percent of those 1886.  





Alabama 2 25 1 26 
Alaska 1 8  8 
Arizona 2 18 3 21 
Delaware  1  1 
District of Columbia 1 15 4 19 
Georgia 4 27  27 
Guam 1 1  1 
Kentucky 1 10 1 11 
Maine  2  2 
Massachusetts 3 42 3 45 
Michigan 3 62 3 65 
Minnesota 2 11 1 12 
North Dakota 1 2 1 3 
New Hampshire  1  1 
New Jersey 3 21 1 22 
New York 8 211 11 222 
North Carolina 8 41  41 
Ohio 3 56 1 57 
Oregon 2 10  10 
South Carolina  6  6 
South Dakota  4 1 5 
Tennessee 2 18 5 23 
Texas 130 248 5 253 
Virginia 3 43 2 45 
West Virginia  9  9 
Wyoming  3  3 
TOTAL 180 895 43 938 
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There are countless activities that people and institutions engage in 
because it is what they have always done. In fact, in many ways what 
constitutes being human is our frequently inconsiderate return to 
habitual pathways regardless of whether they pertain to a morning 
commute to work, conversations with family, friends, and colleagues, 
or conventions relating to the way we eat and dress. When those habits 
rise to the level of bureaucratic procedure, as in criminal due process, 
they may take on superstructural hegemonic significance, ultimately 
manifesting as legal-rational mechanisms for the reproduction of state 
power. Such is the case with our contemporary reliance upon the 
probable cause standard of proof as it applies to the presentation of 
charges, at information hearings, or before a grand jury. It is doubtful 
that prosecutors, defense attorneys, or judges stop to question the 
bureaucratic significance of the probable cause standard, especially as 
it applies to the standard necessary for obtaining an indictment at 
information or grand jury proceedings. Indeed, the standard is so 
ubiquitous and steeped in over fifty years of practice applied to plea 
bargaining, that it has attained hegemonic status. The probable cause 
standard for indictment is taken for granted by everyone who occupies 
the courtroom working group. Like the presumption of innocence, the 
probable cause standard is so ubiquitous that merely questioning the 
prudence of the standard of proof as it pertains to criminal charges 
before a grand jury, for instance, generates a quizzical look akin to 
questioning whether the sun rises in the east. The practical application 
of the probable cause standard of proof required for indictment, a 
standard that has existed for over one-hundred years,67 has taken on an 
essentialist quality that through its proliferation over time, has 
developed a deeply worn channel. The question then becomes: Is it true 
that just because we have been operating on the premise that the 
probable cause standard is hegemonic, must it necessarily be so? 
In an article published in March of 2016 by the Stanford Law 
Review, Professor William Ortman provides a thorough historical 
assessment of the origins and applications of probable cause both in 
England and the United States.68 Professor Ortman’s article provides a 
thorough account of the origin and evolution of probable cause, 
________________________________ 
67.  See Atwell v. United States, 162 F. 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1908).  
68.  See generally William Ortman, Probable Cause Revisited, 68 STAN. L. 
REV. 511 (2016). 
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something that this article will not entirely repeat here. However, it will 
reveal some prescient insights as they may prove to be important in 
assisting my claims. 
As already considered, the standard of proof is an important 
procedural mechanism to ensure fairness. If there were no charging 
standards, a prosecutor could bring a case before a grand jury with 
illegitimate evidence, or even no evidence whatsoever. Ortman 
contends that, “charging standards act as a constraint on prosecutors.”69 
Accordingly, “[t]he more one ratchets up a charging standard. . . the 
more confident one can be that prosecutors are constrained and that 
convicted defendants are actually guilty.”70 
The probable cause standard was known to American judges and 
attorneys at the time of our nation’s founding primarily through English 
“Whig tracts, legal treatises, and justice of the peace manuals.”71 It 
appears that disputes arising between Whigs and Tories are what 
generated intense focus on whether one could be charged and indicted 
before a grand jury based upon “probabilities.”72 The grand jury in 
England originated with the creation of the Assize of Clarendon in 1166 
by Henry II,73 but little attention is given to charging standards until 
Edward Coke and Matthew Hale comment on them in the mid-
seventeenth century. 
Coke and Hale represent what would emerge in the United States 
as the two most prominent narratives on the subject. For Coke, an 
indictment required far greater evidence of guilt than mere probability. 
He contended that, “it is most necessary to have substantial proof.”74 
Hale disagreed. Because a grand jury indictment did not establish guilt 
once and for all and was merely an accusation, Hale argued that the 
existence of “probable evidence” of guilt should be enough to return a 
true bill.75 Political power was the primary motivation for increasing 
attention to the grand jury indictment process. Whigs lost power when 
________________________________ 
69.  Id. at 517 n.19. 
70.  Id. at 518.  
71.  Id. at 526.  
72.  Id. 
73.  Id. at 521.  
74.  Id. at 522.  
75.  Id.  
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King Charles II dissolved the Oxford Parliament.76 Nevertheless, 
Charles went ahead and prosecuted Whigs, including two individuals 
named Stephen Colledge and Anthony Ashley Cooper.77 To prosecute 
his case against Colledge and Cooper, among other Whig activists, 
Charles had to first procure a grand jury indictment.78 The first grand 
jury was empaneled in London where the Whigs held power.79 Both 
men were acquitted when the “grand jury returned an ‘ignoramus,’ what 
today we would call a ‘no bill.’”80 However, Colledge was later 
presented before a grand jury in Oxford, where Charles possessed 
considerably greater power, and was indicted.81 
As Ortman notes, one of the most important publications 
addressing the topic of grand jury indictments was Henry Care’s, 
English Liberties: Or, The Freeborn Subject’s Inheritance, was first 
published in the 1680s.82 There, Care argues for a strict standard to be 
required for grand jury indictment.83 According to Ortman, Care 
challenged Pemberton’s “probable evidence” standard by arguing that 
jurors “must be fully satisfied in their Consciences, that [the defendant] 
is Guilty.”84 Care challenged Pemberton by emphasizing the fact-
finding role of the grand jury.85 
The Founding generation of American judges and attorneys were 
well aware of the debate taking place between Tories and Whigs over 
the evidentiary standard necessary to generate an indictment before a 
grand jury. From our founding through the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, judges routinely applied the stricter evidentiary 
standard introduced by the Whigs. For example, the following 
statement is the jury instructions given by Justice James Wilson of the 
Federal Circuit Court in Pennsylvania, clearly expressing his opposition 
to applying the probable cause standard to grand jury verdicts: 
________________________________ 
76.  Id. at 523.  
77.  Id.  
78.  Id. 
79.  Id. at 524. 
80.  Id.  
81.  Id.  
82.  Id. at 525.  
83.  Id. 
84.  Id.  
85.  Id. 
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Ought not moral certainty to be deemed the necessary basis, of what 
is delivered under the sanction of an obligation so solemn and so 
strict [as a grand jury’s verdict]? The doctrine, that a grand jury may 
rest satisfied merely with probabilities, is a doctrine, dangerous as 
well as unfounded: It is a doctrine, which may be applied to 
countenance and promote the vilest and most oppressive purposes: It 
may be used, in pernicious rotation, as a snare, in which the innocent 
may be entrapped, and as a screen, under the cover of which the 
guilty may escape.86 
Echoing Wilson’s concerns, New Jersey Chief Justice James 
Kinsey said: “[T]ho’ I have often heard it laid down as a rule, that 
probability is a sufficient ground for you to indict a citizen, . . . [I] have 
always viewed it as a principle against which reason revolts.”87 Further, 
Justice Samuel Chase went so far as to argue that the evidence 
necessary to indict should be on par with evidence that would be 
brought before a Petit Jury at trial: “[E]very Grand Jury, before they 
find an indictment, should expect the same proof, and as satisfactory 
evidence of guilt of the accused as the Petit Jury would require to Justify 
their verdict against him.”88 
Echoing the sentiment expressed by these judges, the early 
American judicial system adopted the Whig position regarding the 
magnitude and factual accuracy of evidence required to generate an 
indictment before a grand jury. The reason for this is because of fear 
over the abuse of power; a healthy skepticism regarding the authority 
of the Executive branch to charge and prosecute cases against American 
citizens.89A revolutionary war for independence fought over similar 
concerns may have influenced American judges to adopt stricter 
charging criteria to be certain that the Executive would not abuse its 
prosecutorial authority. Once again, Ortman cites the grand jury 
instruction language that was invoked by judges in the eastern states, 
leaving no doubt about the influence of Whig, and now American 
concerns over abuse of power. Specifically, indictments were only to 
be decided if the grand jury was “satisfied; well satisfied; fully satisfied; 
________________________________ 
86.  Id. at 519. 
87.  Id. at 531–32.  
88.  Id. at 532.  
89.  See David N. Mayer, The English Radical Whig Origins of American 
Constitutionalism, 70 WASH. U. L. REV. 131, 138–39 (1992).   
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[or] convinced;” when there was “the most unequivocal evidence; 
moral certainty; evidence sufficient to convict;” when there were “the 
most probable grounds; the strongest appearance of criminality; or 
when the grand jury had no reasonable cause of doubt.”90 
To summarize, the founding era judges were keenly aware of the 
possibility that the Executive would abuse its power through 
prosecutorial misconduct. While this article provides the reader with 
current data relating to the wrongful conviction of defendants who were 
indicted by a grand jury, but were later proven to be actually innocent, 
the founding era concerns over police and prosecutorial overreach were 
largely anecdotal. Today, however, legal and social science scholars 
have well established the prevalence of police and prosecutorial 
misconduct. Furthermore, errors taking place in police forensics 
laboratories, reliance upon jailhouse informants, false confessions, false 
eyewitness identifications, and inadequate or absent indigent defenses 
have also come to light.91 
In 1905, former President of the United States and Chief Justice of 
the United States Supreme Court, William Howard Taft, said, “the 
administration of the criminal law in all the states of the Union (there 
may be one or two exceptions) is a disgrace to our civilization.”92 Chief 
Justice Taft was cited by Justice Frankfurter in his 1952 dissent in 
Leland v. Oregon.93 While Justice Frankfurter modifies Chief Justice 
Taft’s tone somewhat, he states that no matter how much things may 
have improved in the intervening forty-seven years, “no informed 
person can be other than unhappy about the serious defects of present-
day American criminal justice.”94 In Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme 
Court held that, “[h]owever guilty defendants, upon due inquiry, might 
prove to have been, they were, until convicted, presumed to be 
innocent.”95 In a case where the Court zeroed in on assistance of 
counsel as instrumental to a fair trial, it made the more general 
declaration that, “It was the duty of the court having their cases in 
________________________________ 
90.  Id. at 531.  
91.  See generally JAMES R. ACKER & ALLISON D. REDLICH, WRONGFUL 
CONVICTION (2011).  
92.  Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802–03 (1952) (Frankfurther, J., 
dissenting).  
93.  See id.  
94.  Id. at 802. 
95.  287 U.S. 45, 52 (1932).  
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charge to see that they were denied no necessary incident of a fair 
trial.”96 
A more contemporary exposition of both Chief Justice Taft and 
Justice Frankfurter’s assessment of the sad state of American criminal 
justice bookends more than a century’s worth of concern for fair 
application of due process.97 It has become apparent that the American 
criminal justice system is broken in much the same way that founding 
era judges feared it might be. But the difference today is that the 
probable cause standard has usurped the far stricter emphasis upon near 
certainty of guilt required to indict, and it has done so at precisely the 
moment when plea bargaining demands less evidentiary resistance. 
By 1978, the principle and evidentiary standards pertaining to 
grand jury instructions had substantially changed following publication 
of the Federal Judicial Conference’s model grand jury charge. The new 
language, which was applied in all courtrooms across the United States, 
said: “[Y]our duty [is] to see to it that indictments are returned against 
those who you find probable cause to believe are guilty.”98 
Although not discussed, the fact that defendants are indicted based 
upon probable cause means they are not being protected by the 
Constitution’s Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendments. Instead, they 
are being convicted based upon an anorexic due process that 
significantly increases the likelihood of innocent people being 
wrongfully convicted, and where those who may be factually guilty, but 
who may be guilty of something other than the facts as alleged, will be 
exposed to minimal due process protections. The remainder of this 
article will address the presumption of innocence. 
IV.  PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
As indicated in Part I, the majority in Winship referred to the proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard as procedural manifestation of 
“that bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose enforcement 
lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”99 The 
Court’s reference to the presumption of innocence was echoed by none 
________________________________ 
96.  Id.  
97.  See generally WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE (2011).  
98.  See Ortman, supra note 68, at 520.  
99.  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).  
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other than Alexander Hamilton, when he stated that the presumption of 
innocence was “a great principle of social security.”100 And while it 
would be reasonable to conclude that the majority of Americans are 
familiar with this “axiomatic and bedrock” principle ensconced in 
hundreds of years of common law and popular culture, it is doubtful 
that those same Americans understand that there is no presumption of 
innocence in due process prior to trial.101 
Data collected between June 3 and June 5 of 2013 by the Center for 
Prosecutorial Integrity (CPI) on the topic of prosecutorial misconduct 
included a question about the presumption of innocence.102 As with 
most treatments of the construct, CPI researchers assumed what they 
might well have sought to establish when they asked: “Do you believe 
the presumption of innocence is being lost in our nation’s legal 
system?”103 With an average of 993 individuals responding to thirteen 
questions with a dichotomous “yes” or “no” answer, the CPI indicates 
that 66.8 percent of respondents “think the presumption of innocence is 
becoming lost in our nation’s legal system.”104 It is difficult to deduce 
from the CPI data just what the significance of the presumption of 
innocence is for most Americans, but the hermeneutic beauty of the 
declarative, “presumption of innocence,” is its ontological simplicity 
(or so it would seem).  I agree with Andrew Ashworth’s conviction that: 
The presumption of innocence is a moral and political principle, 
based on a widely shared conception of how a free society. . . should 
exercise the power to punish. One element in this is the high value 
placed on the fundamental right not to be wrongly convicted. 
Another element stems from the huge disparity of resources between 
the State and defendant.105 
________________________________ 
100.  François Quintard-Morénas, The Presumption of Innocence in The French 
and Anglo-American Legal Traditions, 58 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 107, 133 (2010).  
101.  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).  
102.  CPI Survey Methods, CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, 
http://www.prosecutor integrity.org/survey-summary/methods/ (last visited Oct. 20, 
2017). 
103.  Id. 
104.  CPI Survey Highlights, CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, http://www. 
prosecutorintegrity.org/survey-summary/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).  
105.  Andrew Ashworth, Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence, 10 
INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 241 249–50 (2006).  
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While a thorough historical overview of the presumption of 
innocence is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to consider 
its relevance to the democratic administration of justice in the United 
States.106 This is more than an academic dispute. In a 2016 publication, 
the Department of Justice’s Community Oriented Policing Program 
(COPS) issued a report titled “A Victim-Centered Approach,”107 
suggesting that “[a]gencies should have policies and practices that 
ensure victims are treated with respect and care and that victims retain 
some sense of control during the criminal justice process.”108 The 
Ashland, Oregon Police Department’s “You Have Options Program” is 
highlighted in chapter two of the report.109 It discusses how the Victim-
Centered Approach, as one would suppose, is an exemplary way 
forward. The substance of the You Have Options Program is constituted 
by twenty “elements” that were culled by the Ashland Police 
Department from feedback elicited from sexual assault victims to, 
“determine what they needed most from law enforcement . . . .”110 At 
issue here is element number seventeen which states: 
Investigators will collaborate with victims during the investigative 
process and respect a victim’s right to request certain investigative 
steps not be conducted. Criminal investigations will be conducted at 
a pace set by the victim, not the law enforcement officer. Victims 
will be informed that no case can proceed to the arrest or referral to 
________________________________ 
106.  Like pleas, pre-trial detention hearings are based upon the probable cause 
standard where “all the evidence presented pretrial goes to the merits of the case . . . . 
Thus, the defendant quickly gives up her right to due process before a deprivation of 
liberty.” Pre-trial detention hearings are precursors to plea bargains. As such, “with 
one mini-trial, the defendant loses all opportunities to gain access to the umbrella of 
constitutional protections she receives at trial, including the presumption of 
innocence.” See Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 723, 754 (2011). 
107.  U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., OFF. OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., 
IDENTIFYING AND PREVENTING GENDER BIAS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO 
SEXUAL ASSAULT AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 9 (2016) [hereinafter COPS], https://ric-
zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0796-pub.pdf. 
108.  Id. at 2. 
109.  Id. at 12–13. 
110.  Id.  
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an office of prosecution until the investigative process is 
complete.111 
The report goes on to state that “[f]ollowing the implementation of the 
You Have Options Program, the Ashland Police Department saw sexual 
assault reporting increase by more than 100 percent.”112 
Authors of the CPI report, Christopher Perry and Richard Davis, 
have made the important point that throughout the COPS report, 
complainants are referred to as “victims.”113 This immediately suggests 
that a crime has occurred prior to determination by law enforcement.114 
But their most vital concern, as well as mine, is the report’s disregard 
for any sense of a presumption of innocence for the accused. Perry and 
Davis state: 
We agree that trauma-informed interviews, use of victim advocates, 
and respectful interactions are essential and should be encouraged. 
But “victim-centered investigations,” which explicitly instruct the 
officer to believe the complainant, regardless of the circumstances, 
should be discouraged because of the likely negative results. Victim-
centered investigations represent an approach for complainants that 
is built upon a system of injustice for the accused.115 
On a psychological level, nomenclature matters, especially when it 
is oxymoronic. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and COPS appear to 
recommend an approach to investigation of sexual assault allegations 
that is victim-centered, thereby ensconcing the presumption of guilt into 
policy. Thus, the nomenclature being adopted by the DOJ and COPS 
presumes that a crime has been committed. Unfortunately, that 
presumption of guilt will confound law enforcement investigation in 
sexual assault allegations, from the initial point of contact with the 
________________________________ 
111.  Id. at 13 (emphasis added).  
112.  Id. 
113.  Letter from Christopher J. Perry, Program Dir., Ctr. for Prosecutor 
Integrity, & Richard L. Davis, Former Police Lieutenant, Brockton Police Dep’t, to 
Ronald L. Davis, Dir., Office of Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., & Chuck Wexler, 
Exec. Dir., Police Exec. Research Forum (June 6, 2016) (on file with author) (“Finally 
instead of ‘complainant,’ the report repeatedly uses the word ‘victim,’ a word that 
presumes a crime has occurred, which is not always the case.”). 
114.  Id.  
115.  Id. at 2. 
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complainant, through prosecutorial filing of formal charges, and to 
presentment before a grand jury. 
A.  Police Misconduct and Wrongful Conviction 
From arrest to indictment, pressure is placed upon law enforcement 
to make arrests and gain convictions.116 As early as 1934, John A. Seiff, 
publishing on the subject of the presumption of innocence, mentioned 
“the tendency to cast a stone whenever an unfortunate is charged with 
the commission of an offense either against morals or the law.”117 He 
cautions against willful acceptance of suspect confessions because, 
“[t]he source of information is frequently polluted by the zeal of a 
police officer twisting every statement into proof of guilt.”118 
Contemporary documentation of police misconduct as a principle factor 
in causing wrongful convictions appeared in a 2013 Washington 
University Law Review article by Professor Russell Covey.119 Post-
mortem analysis of exoneration cases to document each of the errors 
leading to wrongful convictions appears on both the Innocence 
Project120 and National Registry of Exonerations121 websites. 
Professor Covey addresses the causes of wrongful convictions 
arising from two Texas cases—Ramparts and Tulia.122 He indicates that 
these two cases are responsible for as many as two-hundred wrongful 
convictions with the primary cause being procedural and substantive 
________________________________ 
116.  See Dean Scoville, What’s Really Going on with Crime Rates, POLICE 
MAG. (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/ 
2013/10/what-s-really-going-on-with-crime-rates.aspx (discussing the twin practices 
of inflating and deflating crime statistics). See also Policing and Profit, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 1723 (Apr. 10, 2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/04/policing-and-
profit/. 
117.  John A. Seiff, The Presumption of Innocence, 25 J. OF CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 53, 53 (1934).  
118.  Id. 
119.  See Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful 
Convictions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1133 (2013). 
120.  Government Misconduct, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence 
project.org/causes/government-misconduct/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2017) [hereinafter 
INNOCENCE PROJECT]. 
121.  NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 53.  
122.  Covey, supra note 119, at 1137–43. 
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police perjury.123 Among the examples of procedural perjury was police 
lying about the circumstances of an encounter with a suspect, 
specifically, about receiving consent to search, probable cause, and 
compliance with constitutional rules like administration of Miranda.124 
Substantive perjury refers to incidences where police lie to incriminate 
innocent suspects. In both the Ramparts and Tulia cases, Covey reports 
that police were found to have planted drugs and weapons, lied about 
consent searches, engaged in coercing confessions, and lied about 
having probable cause for searches by making “dropsy” cases where 
police claimed that drugs or weapons fell from the suspect’s person 
thereby appearing in plain view making the evidence admissible.125 
The Innocence Project identifies the following police misconduct 
activities as having been associated with the 344 currently documented 
DNA exonerations: 
(1) Employing suggestion when conducting identification 
procedures, 
(2) Coercing false confessions, 
(3) Lying or intentionally misleading jurors about police 
observations of crime scene events, 
(4) Failing to turn over exculpatory evidence to prosecutors, 
(5) Providing incentives to secure unreliable evidence from 
informants.126 
Moreover, prosecutors have engaged in the following forms of 
misconduct leading to wrongful convictions: 
(1) Withholding exculpatory evidence from the defense, 
(2) Deliberately misleading, mistreating or destroying 
evidence, 
(3) Allowing witnesses that they know or should know are not 
truthful to testify, 
(4) Pressuring defense witnesses not to testify, 
(5) Relying upon fraudulent forensic experts, and 
(6) Making misleading arguments that overstate the probative 
value of testimony.127 
________________________________ 
123.  Id. at 1155. 
124.  Id. at 1158. 
125.  See generally Covey, supra note 119.  
126.  INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 120. 
127.  Id.  
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As mentioned in Part III of this article, at the time of its writing, the 
National Registry of Exonerations indicates there are 1886 exonerations 
in its database.128 In a report released on September 22, 2016, Kaitlin 
Jackson and Samuel Gross presented disturbing data relating to “police 
misconduct and tainted identifications.”129 Of the 1886 exonerations, 
30 percent included unintentional identifications.130 Most importantly, 
26 percent of those cases were the result of lies from witnesses who 
intentionally identified the wrong person.131 Other errors pertained to 
mistakes made by police officers. The patterns identified by Jackson 
and Gross include: 
(1) Misidentifications by witnesses who know the suspect, are 
generally lies. 
(2) Misidentifications by strangers are generally mistakes. 
(3) Police initiated identification procedures, generally in-
person or photographic lineups, almost always involve 
witnesses who are strangers to the suspect. 
(4) Police manipulate an eyewitness into mistakenly believing 
she saw a suspect she did not actually see. 
(5) The police convince the witness that they, the police, know 
the suspect is guilty, which may lead the witness to lie and 
identify a suspect she does not recognize in order to help 
police obtain a conviction. 
(6) Some witnesses are induced to lie and identify innocent 
suspects out of self-interest: they are promised benefits if 
they do, are threatened with harsh consequences if they do 
not, or both.132 
Jackson and Gross analyzed 1365 exonerations through April of 
2014 and found that some type of false identification existed in 75 
percent of these cases.133 In 57 percent of the tainted identifications 
found in this database, the witnesses made mistakes; in 43 percent they 
________________________________ 
128.  NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 53. 
129.  Kaitlin Jackson & Samuel Gross, Tainted Identifications, NAT’L 
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Sept. 22, 2016), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/taintedids.aspx. 
130.  Id. 
131.  Id. 
132.  Id. 
133.  Id. 
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lied.134 There are four police practices identified in these case files that 
are worth noting, and each generated wrongful convictions of actually 
innocent people. These four practices are telling, displaying, repeating, 
and lying.135 
Telling refers to police “telling” the witness who to pick out of a 
lineup, and this occurred in nearly half of the tainted identification 
cases.136 Jackson and Gross found that 12 percent of the tainted 
identifications included situations where “police not only told witnesses 
who to identify but threatened those who were reluctant to do so.”137 
Displaying refers to the police practice of constructing photo and/or live 
arrays in such a way that the suspect is physically unique among others 
appearing in the photo array or live lineup. For example, if police first 
show a suspect a photo array and follow it with a live lineup, they may 
only include one person from the original photo array in the live lineup. 
Consequently, this practice draws the witness’s attention to that 
particular suspect. Other display tactics police use to make a suspect 
standout may include clothing, color versus black and white photos, 
facial hair, and the like.  Repeating refers to the police practice of 
reusing suspects in either a photo array or live lineup after having 
already presented a witness with those same suspects, but where the 
witness could not initially make a positive identification. Repeating 
occurred in 14 percent of the tainted identification cases. Finally, lying 
occurred in 7 percent of the tainted identification cases.138 Specifically, 
“police used false information to explain away discrepancies between 
the suspect and the eyewitness’s initial description.”139 
This information begs the question of whether a pre-trial 
presumption of innocence is necessary. The institutional and sub-
cultural data generated by legal and social science scholars, as well as 
the Innocence Project,140 Innocence Network,141 and National Registry 
________________________________ 
134.  Id. 
135.  Id. 
136.  Id. 
137.  Id. 
138.  Id. 
139.  Id.  
140.  INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 120.  
141.  See generally THE INNOCENCE NETWORK, http://innocencenetwork.org 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2017). 
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of Exonerations142 as it pertains to police misconduct would certainly 
make it seem so.  Would a pre-trial presumption of innocence have a 
significant effect upon police misconduct? Not alone. It would serve as 
a principle that guides improved police procedure and due process. 
However, as the law now stands there is no legal expectation of a pre-
trial presumption of innocence, and as the data presented above makes 
clear, the presumption of guilt that law enforcement operates under 
generates severe consequences for the innocent, as well as crippling 
systemic legitimacy. As Professor Dworkin proclaimed, actually 
innocent people have a fundamental right not to be convicted.143 In fact, 
it is my contention that the United States should consider adopting a 
pre-trial presumption of innocence similar to what has been established 
by European human rights law, where pre-trial procedures are 
conducted, so far as possible, as if the defendant were innocent.144 This 
would require adoption of what Paul Roberts refers to as “the principle 
of asymmetry,” where greater weight is placed upon protection of the 
innocent through adoption of a presumption of innocence as a matter of 
principle.145 
B.  Innocent Until Proven Guilty? 
Is it truly the case, as many actors within the judicial system claim, 
that the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty? If so, when 
should that presumption attach? For example, we know that the 
presumption of innocence does not attach upon arrest, but should it? If 
so, how would that manifest? Upon initial contact with law 
enforcement?146 Upon assignment of counsel? Upon initial 
appearance? Upon presentment before a grand jury? We may all agree 
that once an accused makes an admission or confession to some or all 
facts as alleged in an indictment and thereby enters into a guilty plea, 
then logically, the accused could no longer be presumed innocent. But 
as indicated in Part I above, my concern precedes such an admission or 
________________________________ 
142.  NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 53. 
143.  See Ashworth, supra note 105, at 71. 
144.  Id. at 80. 
145.  Id. at 73.  
146.  See Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 189–90 (2013) (holding that a 
suspect’s pre-Miranda non-custodial silence may be considered by jurors at trial as an 
aggravating factor).  
34
California Western Law Review, Vol. 54 [2018], No. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol54/iss1/3
8 (Do Not Delete) 7/11/2018  11:35 AM 
2017]    STANDARD OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE  85 
confession and instead focuses on due process rights accruing to the 
accused upon arrest. 
C.  Brief Historical Account of the Presumption of Innocence 
The earliest written reference to the presumption of innocence for 
the accused can be found in the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (1792–
1750 BC).147 Allen H. Godbey says, “it is a fundamental principle of 
the code of Hammurabi that the presumption is always in favor of the 
innocence of the accused: the burden of proof is thrown upon the 
accuser.”148 In 352 B.C., Greek orator, Demosthenes, stated, “no man 
comes under that designation [criminal] until he has been convicted and 
found guilty.”149 King Ptolemy of Egypt (118 B.C.), Roman Emperor’s 
Honorius and Theodose (423 A.D.), and French Emperor Charlemagne 
each articulated a similar common commitment to the presumption of 
innocence for the accused prior to conviction.150 
The maxim: “Innocent until proven guilty,” can be traced to 
thirteenth-century France where it is believed that French canonist, 
Johannes Monachus, was the first person to coin this phrase.151 It is 
likely that the French people were well-aware of the maxim by the 
fourteenth-century, despite frequent egregious violations of it during 
the latter Middle Ages.152 However, in what by contemporary standards 
would appear downright progressive, King Louis XVI of France gave 
the presumption of innocence his imprimatur when in “his Declaration 
of May 1788 [he abolished] the humiliating use of the sellette [a 
wooden stool that the accused was forced to sit upon during 
questioning], prohibiting that suspects wear prison garb, and imposing 
________________________________ 
147.  The Babylonian Code of Hammurabi was “developed during the reign of 
Hammurabi of the first dynasty of Babylon [and included] penalties for breaking the 
laws [that] varied according to the status of the offender and circumstances of the 
offense.” Hammurabi’s Code (1792 BC–1750 BC), ONLINE LIBR. OF LIBERTY, 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/hammurabi-s-code-1792-bc-1750-bc (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2018). 
148.  Quintard-Morénas, supra note 100, at 110, 149 n.20 (quoting Allen H. 
Godbey, The Place of the Code of Hammurabi, 15 THE MONIST 199, 210 (1905)).  
149.  Id. at 112 (quoting DEMOSTHENES, AGAINST MEIDIAS, ANDROTION, 
ARISTOCRATES, TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGEITON 231 (J.H. Vince trans., 1935)).  
150.  Id. at 112–14.  
151.  Id. at 114.  
152.  Id. at 115.  
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the publication of judgments of acquittal to reinstate accused 
individuals in the public opinion.”153 In eighteenth-century France, the 
presumption of innocence was premised upon a commitment to treat 
the accused with humanity, which was a concept that also appeared in 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man.154 Finally, by the end of the 
eighteenth-century in Scotland, the presumption of innocence was 
adopted as an aspect of Natural Law.155 
D.  The Presumption of Innocence in the United States 
There is no specific mention of a presumption of innocence in the 
United States Constitution. However, case law has identified three 
distinct locations articulating the spirit of the presumption: the Fifth 
Amendment’s right to remain silent, the Sixth Amendment’s right to a 
jury trial, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.156 The 
Supreme Court first implemented the presumption of innocence into 
United States law in its opinion in Coffin v. United States.157 
The Coffin case presents a fifty count indictment against Theodore 
P. Haughey, Francis A. Coffin, Percival B. Coffin, and Albert S. Reed, 
for “wrongfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and willfully misapply[ing] 
the moneys, funds and credits of said association [Indianapolis National 
Bank] as aforesaid, to wit, the sum of six thousand three hundred and 
eighteen dollars.”158 In an otherwise undifferentiated misdemeanor 
bank fraud case, Coffin is recognized for being the first acknowledged 
Supreme Court affirmation of the presumption of innocence. The Court 
commences its articulation of the presumption of innocence in response 
to the forty-fourth charge presented in the Coffin appeal. In question, 
was a jury instruction that failed to specifically reference the 
________________________________ 
153.  Id. at 122 (emphasis added).  
154.  Id. at 122–23 (“Every man being presumed innocent until he has been 
found guilty, if it shall be deemed absolutely necessary to arrest him, every kind of 
rigor used, not necessary to secure his person, ought to be severely repressed by the 
law.”).  
155.  See id. at 132.  
156. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) (as to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause). 
157.  Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 452 (1895).  
158.  Id. at 436.  
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presumption of innocence.159 The language used by the judge in the 
Coffin, emphasized the necessity for jurors to reach a guilty verdict only 
if they were convinced by the evidence that the defendants were guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.160 Justice White’s opinion reversed the trial 
court’s jury instruction because of its failure to include the 
“presumption of innocence” element as requested by the defendants.161 
The Court could have stopped there, but it did not. 
The greater proportion of the Coffin opinion is dedicated to a 
lengthy exposition regarding the presumption of innocence. It 
commences its presumption of innocence commentary with the now 
famous affirmation: “The principle that there is a presumption of 
innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and 
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the 
administration of our criminal law.”162 From there, Justice White 
launches into a historical contextualization of the presumption of 
innocence that has, despite its critics, been fundamental to the principle 
ever since.163 Justice White begins by citing to Simon Greenleaf’s 
________________________________ 
159.  Id. at 452 (“The law presumes that persons charged with crime are 
innocent until they are proven, by competent evidence, to be guilty. To the benefit of 
this presumption the defendants are all entitled, and this presumption stands as their 
sufficient protection, unless it has been removed by evidence proving their guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”).  
160.  In Coffin, the Supreme Court concluded that, “Before you can find any 
one of the defendants guilty, you must be satisfied of his guilt, as charged in some of 
the counts of the indictment, beyond a reasonable doubt.” The judge continued by 
elaborating upon the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable doubt by instructing jurors 
as to what “reasonable doubt” would entail: “A ‘reasonable doubt,’ as that term is 
employed in the administration of the criminal law, is an honest, substantial 
misgiving, generated by the proof, or the want of it. It is such a state of the proof as 
fails to convince your judgment and conscience and satisfy your reason of the guilt of 
the accused.” Id. at 452–53.  
161.  Id. at 463; see also Bruce A. Antkowiak, The Irresistible Force, 18 TEMP. 
POL. & C.R. L. REV. 1, 31 (2008). 
162.  Id. at 453.  
163.  See James Bradley Thayer, The Presumption of Innocence in Criminal 
Cases, 6 YALE L.J. 185 (1897). Thayer challenges the notion that the presumption of 
innocence should be viewed as evidence weighing in favor of the accused, rather than 
as a principle embedded in the Common Law rule pertaining to guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. “There is no need to trace it further, for no one doubts that in one 
form or another this has always continued to be a great and recognized rule. It has, in 
our inherited system, a peculiarly important function, that of warning our untrained 
tribunal, the jury, against being misled by suspicion, conjecture and mere appearances. 
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publication, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence.164 According to Justice 
White, Greenleaf identifies the origins of the presumption of innocence 
as appearing in ancient Sparta and Athens.165 Justice White then cites 
to Roman law saying, “Let all accusers understand that they are not to 
prefer charges unless they can be proven by proper witnesses or by 
conclusive documents, or by circumstantial evidence which amounts to 
indubitable proof and is clearer than day.”166 Roman emperor Trajan is 
reported to have written to Julius Frontonus that, “no man should be 
condemned on a criminal charge in his absence, because it was better 
to let the crime of a guilty person go unpunished than to condemn the 
innocent.”167 Justice White continues by pointing out that in 1678 Lord 
Hale said: 
In some cases presumptive evidence goes far to prove a person 
guilty, though there be no express proof of the fact to be committed 
by him; but then it must be very warily pressed, for it is better five 
guilty persons should escape unpunished than one innocent person 
should die.168 
Hale’s maxim is followed by Blackstone’s, which doubles the number 
of guilty we’d prefer to see released than to convict one innocent 
person.169 He also references “McKinley’s” case from 1817, where an 
incredulous Lord Gillies stated: 
But the presumption in favor of innocence is not to be reargued [to 
prove wrong or invalid] by mere suspicion. I am sorry to see, in this 
________________________________ 
In saying that the accused person shall be proved guilty, it says also that he shall not 
be presumed guilty; that he shall be convicted only upon legal evidence, not tried upon 
prejudice; that he shall not be made the victim of the circumstances of suspicion which 
surround him, the effect of which it is always so difficult to shake off . . . that after an 
investigation by the grand jury he has been indicted, imprisoned, seated in the 
prisoner’s dock, carried away handcuffed, isolated, watched, made an object of 
distrust to all that behold him.” Id. at 196. 
164.  Coffin, 156 U.S. at 454.  
165.  Id. 
166.  Id. (citing Code, L. IV, T. XX, 1, 1. 25).  
167.  Id.  
168.  Id. at 456.  
169.  Id. (“The law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that 
one innocent suffer.”).  
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information, that the public prosecutor treats this too lightly. He 
seems to think that the law entertains no such presumption of 
innocence. I cannot listen to this. I conceive that this presumption is 
to be found in every code of law which has reason and religion and 
humanity for a foundation. It is a maxim which ought to be inscribed 
in indelible characters in the heart of every judge and juryman, and I 
was happy to hear from Lord Hermand he is inclined to give full 
effect to it.170 
Justice White’s exegesis suggests that there is no known reference 
in the United States to the presumption of innocence until the 
publication of McNally’s Evidence in 1802.171 He contends that this is 
likely due to the ubiquitous American awareness of the principle, and 
therefore it was not necessary to overtly discuss it.172 He  also cites to a 
statement made in an 1889 publication in Criminal Law Magazine: 
“The practice of stating this principle to juries is so nearly universal that 
very few cases are found where error has been assigned upon the failure 
or refusal of a judge to do so.”173 
The Justice White opinion has drawn considerable debate over its 
contention that “the presumption of innocence is evidence in favor of 
the accused, introduced by the law in his behalf (emphasis added),”174 
instead of serving as a guiding principle signifying proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. But for the Court in Coffin, the proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard owes its origin to the ancient Greek and 
Roman expression of the presumption of innocence that privileged 
“their devotion to human liberty and individual rights.”175 In perhaps 
his strongest statement in defense of retaining the presumption of 
innocence as an evidentiary element, Justice White stated: 
The inevitable tendency to obscure the results of a truth, when the 
truth itself is forgotten or ignored, admonishes that the protection of 
________________________________ 
170.  Id.  
171.  Id. at 455. 
172.  Id.  
173.  Id. at 458.  
174.  Id. at 460. For later criticism of this point, see Thayer, supra note 163, at 
189–90. 
175.  Id.  
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so vital and fundamental a principle as the presumption of innocence 
be not denied, when requested, to any one accused of a crime.176 
So ends the Coffin opinion and its unequivocal support for the 
presumption of innocence. With the exception of the Court’s defense of 
the presumption of innocence as evidence in favor of the accused (a 
point taken up only two years later by the Supreme Court in Agnew v. 
United States177) the full-throated defense of the presumption of 
innocence in Coffin would stand as prevailing law until 1979 when the 
Court confronted the question in the case of Bell v. Wolfish.178 
However, two cases preceding Bell are each worth mentioning for 
immediate historical context. 
In Estelle v. Williams,179 the United States Supreme Court 
addressed the question as to whether an accused who was standing trial 
before a jury, and who was presented in court wearing prison clothes, 
amounted to a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process 
rights pertaining to the presumption of innocence.180 The greater 
proportion of the Court’s opinion stresses the importance of the 
presumption of innocence by citing Coffin. The Court acknowledges 
the probity of adhering to the presumption of innocence going so far as 
to assert: 
[T]hat compelling the accused to stand trial in jail garb operates 
usually against only those who cannot post bail prior to trial. Persons 
who can secure release are not subjected to this condition. To impose 
the condition on one category of defendants, over objection, would 
be repugnant to the concept of equal justice embodied in the 
Fourteenth Amendment (citation omitted).181 
________________________________ 
176.  Id.  
177.  See 165 U.S. 36, 52 (1897) (holding similarly to Coffin regarding the 
centrality of the presumption of innocence, but with the one significant exception 
being its rejection of the opinion that the presumption of innocence should be 
considered evidence in favor of the accused).  
178.  441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
179.  425 U.S. 501 (1976). 
180.  Id. at 502 (“We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether an 
accused who is compelled to wear identifiable prison clothing at his trial by a jury is 
denied due process or equal protection of the laws.”). 
181.  Id. at 505–06. 
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Here, the Court clearly seems to recognize the symbolic significance of 
a defendant being presented before a jury in prison clothes thereby 
indicating guilt. Despite its obvious commitment to the presumption of 
innocence in principle, the majority held in favor of the state.182 
A far stronger assertion of the principle and constitutional verity of 
the presumption of innocence can be found in the Supreme Court’s 
1978 opinion in Taylor v. Kentucky.183 In Taylor, the Court cites to 
Estelle by emphasizing that, “the presumption of innocence, although 
not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial 
under our system of criminal justice.”184 At issue in Taylor was a 
request by the defendant to have the trial judge include a presumption 
of innocence statement along with recitation of the proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard, which the judge refused.185 Additionally, in 
its opening and closing statements, the prosecution referred to the fact 
that by virtue of simply being arrested, indicted, and appearing in court 
as a defendant, the jury was permitted “to draw inferences of guilt.”186 
For the Court, this was a bridge too far. Important to note, in its opinion 
the Court dismissed an attempt by the Commonwealth of Kentucky to 
argue that precedent from another case, Howard v. Fleming,187 “does 
not require instructions on the presumption of innocence.”188 Rather, 
the Court clarified the Howard opinion (and by extension Agnew), to 
mean that the presumption of innocence instruction may not include 
reference to the presumption being considered as evidence in favor of 
the accused.189 
________________________________ 
182.  Id. at 510. Here, the majority contended that while it may often be 
inappropriate for the defendant to appear before a jury wearing prison clothes, there 
may be times when it serves the defendant’s interests to do so. But because there was 
no objection by defense counsel to his client being presented at trial wearing prison 
clothes, the Court concluded that there was no evidence that “non-bailed defendants 
were compelled to stand trial in prison garments if timely objection was made to the 
trial judge.” 
183.  436 U.S. 478 (1978).  
184.  Id. at 479 (citing Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503).  
185.  Id. at 490. 
186.  Id. at 487. 
187.  191 U.S. 126 (1903).  
188.  Taylor, 436 U.S. at 489–90.  
189.  Id. at 490. 
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A trial judge may, however, issue a presumption of innocence 
instruction that intersects with the rule established in Winship, requiring 
that jurors must consider whether each of the elements in the case have 
met evidentiary standards of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.190 
Therefore, in Taylor, the Supreme Court once again affirmed the 
centrality of the presumption of innocence as manifested in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and fundamental fairness 
clauses. However, in an about face occurring only one year later in the 
case of Bell v. Wolfish,191 the Supreme Court would severely limit the 
presumption of innocence. 
At issue in Bell were questions pertaining to whether various 
aspects of pre-trial detention violated the defendant’s presumption of 
innocence.192 Citing Coffin, Taylor, Estelle, and Winship, the Court 
acknowledges the centrality of the presumption of innocence as an 
aspect of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.193 But without citing to any 
legal authority, the Court then truncates the presumption by asserting 
that “it has no application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial 
detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun.”194 This 
means that there is no presumption of innocence prior to trial. 
Commenting on the Bell opinion in an article addressing the origins of 
the presumption of innocence in both civil and common law, Quintard-
Morénas states that: 
The one-dimensional conception of the presumption of innocence 
endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1979 [Bell v. Wolfish], is 
more than a departure from the Anglo-American tradition. It 
challenges the very foundation of a social contract in which society, 
by prohibiting private vengeance and guaranteeing the right to be 
tried by an impartial jury, acknowledges that there is a time for 
innocence and a time for guilt.195 
The question then becomes, to presume or to hold? The question over 
whether the presumption of innocence should be tied to a law of proof, 
________________________________ 
190.  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
191.  441 U.S. 520 (1979).  
192.  Id. at 523. 
193.  Id. at 533. 
194.  Id. 
195.  Quintard-Morénas, supra note 100, at 109.   
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or, as Natural Law theorists and judges would have it, be returned to its 
substantive meaning from antiquity, is intriguing. It is not just a matter 
of semantics either. In People v. Gazulis196 the Court held that, “[i]t is, 
perhaps, unfortunate that the ‘presumption of innocence’ is loosely 
referred to by the judiciary and the bar as a ‘presumption;’ it is all of 
that and more . . . . The ‘presumption’ of innocence is a substantive 
right and not a procedural or evidentiary rule.”197 It is my belief that 
this opinion was shared by Justices Stevens and Brennan in their Bell 
dissent: 
An empirical judgment that most persons formally accused of 
criminal conduct are probably guilty would provide a rational basis 
for a set of rules that treat them like convicts until they establish their 
innocence. No matter how rational such an approach might be no 
matter how acceptable in a community where equality of status is the 
dominant goal – it is obnoxious to the concept of individual freedom 
protected by the Due Process clause (emphasis added).198 
Striking at the heart of the point being advanced in this article, the 
dissenters conclude by saying, “In sum, although there may be some 
question as to what it means to treat a person as if he was guilty, there 
can be no dispute that the government may never do so at any point in 
advance of conviction.”199 Although dissenting opinions are not legal 
authority, it is clear from the preceding case law that the dissenters got 
it right. That said, the 1970s ended with a significantly revised 
interpretation of the presumption of innocence that limits its protections 
solely to trial. 
After the Bell opinion, we know that no presumption of innocence 
prior to trial exits. We can now answer the questions posed at the 
beginning of this section by concluding that there is no presumption of 
innocence upon arrest, upon assignment of counsel, or through the 
grand jury indictment process leading up to the decision to plead not 
guilty and proceed to trial, or even at the commencement of guilty plea 
negotiations. Recall for a moment my contention that the administration 
of justice in the United States is a two-tiered system of rights 
________________________________ 
196.  People v. Gazulis, 212 N.Y.S.2d 910, 943 (N.Y. City Ct. 1961). 
197.  Quintard-Morénas, supra note 100, at 110 n.347. 
198.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
199.  Id. at 599.  
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protections. The first tier is that significant constitutional protections 
are afforded to those who plead not guilty and go to trial; these people 
will subsequently be cloaked in the lingua franca of presumed 
innocence. The second is for those who never realize the presumption 
of innocence because they interrupt the flow of constitutional 
protections by ending the process with a guilty plea. This is because for 
those who waive their right to trial, from arrest through indictment and 
admission or confession, there is only the presumption of guilt. 
Accordingly, I am in complete agreement with Bell dissenters, 
Justices Stevens and Brennan, in their conclusion that: 
An empirical judgment that most persons formally accused of 
criminal conduct are probably guilty would provide a rational basis 
for a set of rules that treat them like convicts until they establish their 
innocence. No matter how rational such an approach might be, no 
matter how acceptable in a community where equality of status is the 
dominant goal – it is obnoxious to the concept of individual freedom 
protected by the Due Process Clause. If ever accepted in this country, 
it would work a fundamental change in the character of our free 
society.200 
But this presumption of guilt is precisely what is imposed upon every 
person accused of a crime from arrest through indictment. The Court’s 
opinion in Bell flies in the face of historical precedent. Even as far back 
as 1764, Cesare Beccaria declared: 
No man can be judged a criminal until he be found guilty; nor can 
society take from him the public protection until it have been proved 
that he has violated the conditions on which it was granted. What 
right, then, but that of power, can authorise the punishment of a 
citizen so long as there remains any doubt of his guilt? This dilemma 
is frequent. Either he is guilty, or not guilty. If guilty, he should only 
suffer the punishment ordained by the laws, and torture becomes 
useless, as his confession is unnecessary, if he be not guilty, you 
torture the innocent; for, in the eye of the law, every man is innocent 
whose crime has not been proved.201 
________________________________ 
200. Id. at 579. 
201. Cesare Beccaria, Of Crimes and Punishments: Of Torture, 
CONSTITUTION.ORG, http://www.constitution.org/cb/crim_pun.htm (last visited Sept. 
1, 2017).  
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“Axiomatic” is how the Winship Court referred to the presumption of 
innocence.202 And despite the Bell Court’s contention that it only 
applies at trial, it is still the case that, “the presumption of innocence is, 
along with its sister, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the Holy Grail 
of the criminal justice system,”203 and a “cornerstone of Justice in 
Western Civilization.”204 
Based on his personal experience, Judge Mark W. Bennett, a 
veteran district court judge for the Northern District of Iowa, concluded 
that most jurors have no idea what the presumption of innocence 
actually means.205 For example, Judge Bennett cites his attempts as a 
young trial court judge in the mid-1990s to discern the extent to which 
prospective jurors understood the presumption. He began by asking the 
jurors to take a good look at the defendant and tell him whether they 
(the jurors) believed defendant was guilty.206 Jurors routinely 
responded by saying, “I have no idea, I haven’t heard any of the 
evidence yet.”207 For Judge Bennett, this experiment with jurors was 
chilling because it was clear to him that they did not have any 
understanding of the pre-trial presumption of innocence.208 
Consequently, Judge Bennett now explains to jurors that: 
[T]he presumption of innocence is so important that it applies in 
every criminal case from Maine to California and Hawaii to Florida. 
It applies in all 94 federal district courts and all state courts. The 
presumption, and “reasonable doubt”. . . are, for my money, the two 
most important concepts in the American judicial system.209 
Perhaps most efficacious and visually dramatic, Judge Bennett goes 
further by explaining to jurors that the presumption of innocence is “a 
steel curtain that surrounds the accused . . . . The presumption 
________________________________ 
202.  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970). 
203.  Judge Mark W. Bennett, The Presumption of Innocence and Trial Court 
Judges: Our Greatest Failing, THE CHAMPION 18 (Apr. 2015).  
204.  Joseph C. Cascarelli, Presumption of Innocence and Natural Law: 
Machiavelli and Aquinas, AM. J. OF JURIS. 229, 231 (1996).  
205.  Bennett, supra note 203, at 18. 
206.  Id. 
207.  Id. 
208.  Id.  
209.  Id. at 19.  
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surrounds the accused throughout the entire trial . . . . I explain that the 
presumption may, all by itself, be sufficient to find the accused not 
guilty.”210 I share this recitation of Judge Bennett’s experiences and his 
thoughtful approach to educating jurors and discerning whether jurors 
actually understand the presumption of innocence, because Judge 
Bennett is applying the lessons he learned to the trial. 
Even at trial, with its constitutional protections and application of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, it is not clear whether jurors properly 
adopt the presumption of innocence. Similar findings were reported in 
a much more substantial study conducted by Mitchell J. Frank and 
Dawn Broschard.211 In their study of actual jurors, Frank and Broschard 
had the members respond to  a statement, such as, “I believed 
throughout the entire trial that the defendant was presumed 
innocent.”212 The results of this poll were described by Frank and 
Broschard as “disturbing.”213  “Out of 564 responding criminal jurors, 
more than one in five, 21.1%, disagreed with this most fundamental 
protection. Of equal importance—some may say it is greater—fewer 
than one in four jurors, 24.3%, ‘agreed strongly’ with it.”214 
It is clear that Judge Bennett takes the presumption of innocence at 
trial very seriously. Let us juxtapose his approach to the one that was 
applied to the Boston Marathon bombing case.215 In that case, which 
took place on April 15, 2013, prospective jurors were provided with a 
101 question questionnaire.216 One of the questions asked jurors 
whether they believed that Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, one of the two people 
accused of the Boston Marathon bombing, was guilty.217 According to 
Masha Gessen writing for the The New Yorker, most believed that he 
________________________________ 
210.  Id.   
211.  Mitchell J. Frank & Dawn Broschard, The Silent Criminal Defendant and 
the Presumption of Innocence: In the Hands of Real Jurors, is Either of them Safe?, 
10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 237, 260 (2006).   
212.  Id. 
213.  Id. 
214.  Id. 
215.  In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2015). 
216.  Id. at 35. 
217.  Id.  
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was guilty.218 While this is not surprising given the media attention 
directed at the case, the judge’s response during voir dire when 
questioned about whether a proper presumption of innocence 
instruction was being delivered to prospective jurors is troubling. 
According to Gessen, “[t]he judge sided with the prosecution, saying 
that ‘presumption of innocence’ is ‘a term of art’ that does not actually 
mean presuming the innocence of a defendant.”219 So, even in a high 
profile trial like Tsarnaev’s, the judge diminished the presumption to 
little more than a rhetorical tool. However, it may be that this response 
is an outlier and that most judges adopt the more historically 
conventional application of the presumption of innocence as an aspect 
of a proof beyond a reasonable doubt finding. 
In his application of Natural Law to the presumption of innocence 
and the “knock and announce rule,” Joseph Cascarelli seems to suggest 
that the presumption must attach prior to trial.220 For example, 
application of the “knock and announce rule”221 requires police officers 
with a warrant to “knock and announce” their presence prior to entering 
a home.222 This is because, according to Cascarelli, the law first 
________________________________ 
218.  Masha Gessen, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and the Presumption of Innocence, 
THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-presumption-innocence.  
219.  Id. 
220.  Cascarelli, supra note 204, at 267. 
221.  The probity of the knock and announce rule was upheld in Hudson v. 
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). At issue in Hudson was whether evidence gathered 
in violation of the knock and announce rule should be excluded. In a 5–4 opinion with 
Justice Scalia writing for the majority, the Court held that knocking and announcing 
and only waiting for three to five seconds before entering amounted to a Fourth 
Amendment violation. However, the majority also held that the evidence seized could 
be introduced at trial. Why? For Justice Scalia, the knock and announce rule spoke to 
a specific set of values—“the lives, safety, and dignity of the inhabitants and the 
protection of property.” The knock and announce rule did not prohibit police officers 
from seeing and seizing evidence that was identified for seizure in the search warrant. 
See ZALMAN, supra note 24, at 74. What is primarily at issue for me is Justice Scalia’s 
reference to the life, safety, and dignity of the suspects who are the subjects of the 
warrant. Those values are consistent with the presumption of innocence, especially in 
a Natural Law context. 
222.  However, drug interdiction cases have increasingly led to no-knock 
warrants if police officers believe that the items they are looking for may be destroyed, 
or if by knocking in advance there may be a threat to police officer safety. See Wilson 
v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995) (where the Supreme Court held that exceptions 
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presumes that people are law abiding citizens.223 Cascarelli cites to Kerr 
v. State of California224 and the specific reference to the presumption 
of innocence articulated by Justice William Brennan: 
The first is that any exception not requiring a showing of such 
awareness [of police officer’s presence by the occupants of the 
home] necessarily implies a rejection of the inviolable presumption 
of innocence.225 
How does Justice Brennan’s “inviolable presumption of innocence” 
explain police practices that clearly fly in the face of it? Is it true, as 
Quintard-Morénas suggests, that “[a]ll too often suspects are treated as 
guilty by a society that owes them protection, even in light of the 
appalling nature of the alleged crime[?]”226 After all, 
Police are trained to act on a presumption of guilt in ways that 
exacerbate natural tendencies toward confirmation bias. Police are 
trained, for example, to make quick assessments of guilt and to 
interrogate suspects, not to learn information about the case, but to 
obtain a confession that confirms their suspicions.227 
It seems, therefore, that the presumption of guilt and not the 
presumption of innocence initiates the criminal investigation process. 
There can be little doubt that in order for law enforcement to 
investigate cases of alleged harm, it must in some way be legally 
permitted to detain suspects for questioning. However, there is an 
important caveat to this principle. Law enforcement should be required 
to take extreme steps, consistent with the historical presumption of 
________________________________ 
to knock and announce included: a threat of physical violence; a suspect escapes from 
an officer and retreats to his dwelling; a demand to open the door is refused; and there 
is reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were 
given). 
223.  Cascarelli, supra note 204, at 266. 
224.  Kerr v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 56 (1963).  
225.  Cascarelli, supra note 204, at 267 (quoting Kerr v. California, 374 U.S. 
23, 56 (1963)). 
226.  Quintard-Morénas, supra note 100, at 109.  
227.  Keith Findley, The Presumption of Innocence Exists in Theory, Not 
Reality, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-
theory/wp/2016/01/19/the-presumption-of-innocence-exists-in-theory-not-reality/.  
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innocence discussed above, to ensure that suspects’ reputations are not 
tarnished by either the arrest or the investigation. 
Let us consider one of the conditions under which a suspect may be 
properly detained. Suspects may be detained by law enforcement for 
questioning, “ensuring a person’s attendance at trial, safeguarding the 
judicial process from interference by a defendant, and protecting the 
security of the facility if a defendant is detained.”228 Most important, 
and consistent with historical invocations of the presumption of 
innocence, the state must be committed to ensuring that the reputation 
of the accused is preserved. This may be accomplished by seeking as a 
matter of policy to make suspect arrests outside the public eye and 
thereby avoiding the proverbial “perp walk.”229 But that is just the 
beginning. Clearly, as referenced above, law enforcement strategies 
designed to procure confessions based upon presumptions of guilt 
violate not only their truth-seeking and evidence gathering functions, 
but also may lead to wrongfully convicting the innocent.230 Once again, 
the literature addressing each of the known correlates pertaining to 
wrongful conviction is extensive. But it is clear that for law 
enforcement the pressure to arrest, tunnel vision, destruction of 
evidence, the pressure to induce confessions, reliance upon inaccurate 
eyewitness identification procedures, and reliance upon faulty forensic 
practices have each been identified with wrongful conviction.231 As it 
pertains to the presumption of innocence, and assurances regarding the 
________________________________ 
228.  Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 723, 768 (2011). 
229.  Id. at 768–69. 
230.  For several examples of false confessions leading to wrongful convictions, 
see TRUE STORIES OF FALSE CONFESSIONS (Rob Warden & Steven A. Drizin eds., 
2009). See also ACKER & REDLICH, supra note 91; BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING 
THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011); DAN SIMON, 
IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS (2012); Hannah 
Laqueur, Stephen Rushin & Jonathan Simon, Wrongful Conviction, Policing, and the 
“Wars on Crime and Drugs,” in EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 92–107 
(Allison D. Redlich et al. eds., 2014).  
231.  For a detailed set of exoneration cases and causes, see NAT’L REGISTRY 
OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 53. Out of 2110 exonerations since 1989, the Registry 
identifies as the leading causes of wrongful conviction, in order of prevalence: perjury 
or false accusation, official misconduct, mistaken eyewitness identification, false or 
misleading forensic evidence, and false confession. 
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reliability of evidence procured,232 much could be gained by changing 
police sub-culture to: (a) avoid tunnel vision, (b) alter police 
interrogation methods, (c) improve eyewitness identification 
procedures to avoid biasing witnesses consistent with police 
assumptions, (d) changing criminal procedure so that police are no 
longer permitted to lie to suspects about evidence against them,233 (e) 
changing criminal procedure so that suspects are permitted to have legal 
representation present for photographic eyewitness identification 
procedures,234 and (f) changing criminal procedure to severely limit the 
use of showups.235 Another alarming trend is that now law enforcement 
may not only deduce from a suspect’s pre-Mirandized, non-custodial 
silence that she or he is guilty, but that silence may now be used by 
________________________________ 
232.  My thanks to Professor Christopher Slobogin for emphasizing the 
difference between what must be required of law enforcement when it comes to 
preserving the presumption of innocence, and those procedural activities necessary to 
procure reliable evidence necessary to establish proof of guilt. The point that I am 
attempting to make here is that if law enforcement adopts the presumption of 
innocence upon arrest, that ethic will stimulate enhanced procedural controls 
necessary for the generation of valid and reliable evidence.  
233.  Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969). 
234.  Current law restricts suspect access to assigned counsel to live lineups. 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The Supreme Court denied the right to 
the presence of assigned counsel during police presentation of a photo array to an 
eyewitness in the case of United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973). Given the 
ubiquity of photo arrays, and what is known about the procedural errors that may 
occur if photo arrays are not properly administered, this is a matter that should return 
to the Supreme Court for reconsideration. 
235.  Wrongful conviction scholarship has influenced new state criminal 
procedure by confronting the serious shortcomings expressed in the Neil v. Biggers, 
409 U.S. 188 (1972) and Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) totality of the 
circumstances test. As early as 1986 the state of Utah’s Supreme Court held in State 
v. Long that, “several of the [Biggers/Brathwaite] criteria listed by the Court are based 
on assumptions that are flatly contradicted by well-respected and essentially 
unchallenged empirical studies.” State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 491 (Utah 1986). 
Perhaps the most comprehensive overhaul of a state eyewitness identification 
procedure has taken place in the state of New Jersey. In State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 
872 (2011), the New Jersey Supreme Court significantly modified its state eyewitness 
identification procedures based upon current science. Beginning with Part III of its 
opinion, “Proof of Misidentifications,” and continuing with Part V, “Scope of 
Scientific Research,” the Court iterates in methodical fashion the most current 
eyewitness identification scholarship. 
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prosecutors as incriminating evidence.236 Were the presumption of 
innocence to carry any pre-trial weight this kind of Supreme Court 
opinion, apparently predicated upon enhancing police investigation and 
prosecutorial powers, would be viewed as unprincipled and dangerous. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As a hegemonic practice, plea bargaining is ubiquitous. It meets 
systemic needs for efficiency and the preservation of scarce local 
resources that otherwise would be dedicated to preparation for, and 
administration of, trials. But is this legally rational and cost-benefitting 
institutional remedy the most principled way to manifest the 
administration of justice in a democratic state? 
This article sets out to address two fundamental principles directly 
affecting plea convictions—the standard of proof required for 
indictment, and the presumption of innocence. As discussed, the ease 
with which prosecutors procure indictments in grand jury states, 
accompanied by the lack of a robust pre-trial presumption of innocence, 
increases the likelihood of wrongful conviction. Contemporary criminal 
procedure must return to the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
to indict as originally adopted by our founding judges, out of concern 
for and for precisely the same reason discussed in this article.237 Judicial 
________________________________ 
236. See Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 188–90 (2013). 
237.  In two compelling papers, Professor Slobogin argues for adoption of what 
he refers to as “Hybrid-Inquisitorialism” to replace our current retributive adversarial 
plea system. Christopher Slobogin, Plea Bargaining and the Substantive and 
Procedural Goals of Criminal Justice: From Retribution and Adversarialism to 
Preventative Justice and Hybrid-Inquisitorialism 1 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Pub. 
Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 15–4, 2015); Christopher Slobogin, 
Lessons from Inquisitorialism (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law and Legal 
Theory, Working Paper No. 13–36, 2013). Each paper provides detailed application 
of a hybrid-inquisitorial model that would in many ways provide enhanced due 
process protections. I consider Professor Slobogin’s hybrid-inquisitorial model as 
complementary to the argument made in this article, in that Professor Slobogin shares 
many of the same concerns over the lack of the presumption of innocence, 
prosecutorial control over adversarial due process, and the ambiguous Rule 11 
“factual basis” conviction language. In particular, in Lessons from Inquisitorialism, 
supra at 23, Slobogin suggests that “[i]n an inquisitorial regime, the judge would have 
an obligation to conduct an independent investigation of facts relevant to sentencing, 
whether that investigation takes place during a plea hearing or at a separate sentencing 
proceeding.” A judge’s involvement with factual determinations regarding defendant 
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concerns about prosecutorial overreach that were common at our 
founding were primarily driven by our American experiences with 
England. Today, legal and social science scholars have generated 
comprehensive assessments of the causes and correlates producing 
wrongful convictions of actually innocent men and women. Americans 
are no longer a colonized people concerned about abuses of 
monarchical power. However, the modern American justice system is 
fraught with recognized pre-trial errors of omission and commission. 
These errors highlight the concerns expressed by President Taft, Justice 
Frankfurter, and William Stuntz, each of whom were cited in this 
Article as viewing the American criminal justice system as being in 
serious need of resuscitation. 
It is true that plea bargaining is an important instrument of state 
authority necessary to efficiently process felony criminal cases and has 
hegemonic ubiquity throughout the system. However, it is apparent to 
me that the failure of both Supreme Court case law, and 
Congressionally generated federal rules legitimating pleas, has created 
a shadow administration of justice that is anything but just. As a nation, 
we valorize a system of due process that affords rights protections 
accruing to defendants who elect to plead not guilty and go to trial. Yet 
there remains the presumption of guilt from arrest through indictment, 
and the opaque exercise of prosecutorial authority that constitutes 95 to 
97 percent of all felony convictions procured by way of the plea. 
Viewed in this context, Federal Rule 11 with its “rational” colloquy 
ostensibly designed to assure the court, and serve as a palliative to the 
public, that a defendant is entering the plea knowingly and voluntarily, 
in addition to the requirement that pleas must possess a “factual basis” 
(not yet clearly defined by either a court or the United States Congress), 
is a tissue-thin cloak to legitimate what is otherwise a severe usurpation 





guilt would, in my view, enhance both the presumption of innocence and enhance the 
validity, reliability, and quantum of proof necessary to meet the proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard. On this last point Professor Slobogin and I would likely 
part company, as I have not read that he would support the enhanced burden of proof 
that I am suggesting here that would be required to return a true bill. See Plea 
Bargaining and Lessons from Inquisitorialism, supra. 
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